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Abstract: Modernity, Alienation and the Mirror in the Work of Lacan and Winnicott 
Lacan and Winnicott are both profoundly psychosocial thinkers who shared an interest in the 
modern psyche and the alienation often considered endemic to it. From Freud, Lacan took the 
theory of narcissism (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991), which he developed into a wide-ranging 
critique of the psychosocial constitution of the modern subject. Winnicott, on the other hand, 
trained his eye on the environmental conditions necessary for feeling authentic, or ‘real,’ and 
the experiences that might produce alienation from this ‘true’ self, and encourage the 
formation of a narcissistic ‘false’ self (Donald W. Winnicott, 1990). In this context, Lacan 
and Winnicott’s shared interest in the metaphor and function of the mirror, which has long 
provided an entry point for clinical and academic comparisons of their work, is a key point of 
orientation. This article seeks to explore and unpack the relationship between Lacan and 
Winnicott’s interest in narcissism, alienation and the mirror, locating their thinking in relation 
to dominant philosophical conceptions of subjectivity and sociological understandings of 
modernity, dating from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century. Situating Lacan and 
Winnicott on this terrain throws their theories of the mirror into relief in important ways. Not 
only is the ‘modern’ character of psychoanalysis foregrounded, the contribution it can make 
to social transformation is also affirmed.  
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Modernity, Alienation and the Mirror in the Work of Lacan and Winnicott 
“After having opposed the names of Lacan and Winnicott,” writes Andre Green (2011), 
“today it is frequent to bring them together” (p. 29). As Green suggests, Winnicott and Lacan 
are thinkers whose ideas can seem antithetical. Whilst Winnicott is concerned with the 
development of the self in the context of a ‘good enough’ experience of care giving, Lacan’s 
theory of the subject challenges the very idea of the self. What we have here, writes Lewis 
Kirshner (2011), introducing a collection of essays on the two theorists, are “two seemingly 
incompatible theories of the origins and structure of the human psyche” (p. xi). Yet Lacan 
and Winnicott are both profoundly psychosocial thinkers who shared an interest in the 
modern psyche and the alienation often considered endemic to it. From Freud, Lacan took the 
theory of narcissism (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991), which he developed into a wide-ranging 
critique of the psychosocial constitution of the modern subject. Winnicott, on the other hand, 
trained his eye on the environmental conditions necessary for feeling authentic, or ‘real,’ and 
the experiences that might produce alienation from this ‘true’ self, and encourage the 
formation of a narcissistic ‘false’ self (Donald W. Winnicott, 1990). In this context, Lacan 
and Winnicott’s shared interest in the metaphor and function of the mirror, which has long 
provided an entry point for clinical and academic comparisons of their work (Coulson, 2013; 
Eigen, 2004; Hirsch, 1997; Lebeau, 2009; Rudnytsky, 1991; Rustin, 1991; Wright, 1991), is a 
key point of orientation. The mirror is present in Lacan’s thinking from early on. He first 
presented the concept of the ‘Mirror Stage’ at the 14th International Congress of 
Psychoanalysis at Marienbad, which took place in 1936. Winnicott, however, turned to the 
mirror at the end of his career, in 1967, prompted by Lacan’s intervention, and what 
Winnicott believed Lacan’s theory of the ‘Mirror Stage’ did not address (1991).  
This article seeks to explore and unpack the relationship between Lacan and 
Winnicott’s interest in narcissism, alienation and the mirror, locating their thinking in relation 
to dominant philosophical conceptions of subjectivity and sociological understandings of 
modernity, dating from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century. The preoccupation of 
these psychoanalytic thinkers with these themes points up a link between the assumptions of 
psychoanalysis and the philosophical and sociological discourses of, and on, modernity. 
Stanley Cavell (1987) notes that psychoanalysis inherits the preoccupations and assumptions 
of classical German philosophy (p. 391), whilst Rita Felski (1995) points out that “the 
discourse of sociology has affected the ways in which all of us envision the modern,” 
psychoanalysis in particular (p. 36). Situating Lacan and Winnicott on this terrain throws 
their theories of the mirror into relief in important ways. 
The mirror, as both object and metaphor, has played a central role in shaping how 
Europe, the triumphal ‘West,’ has come to understand itself and its relation to the world over 
the course of modernity. Writing on the history of the mirror and its impact on European 
culture, Sabine Melchior-Bonnet (2001) notes that mirror production expanded greatly 
around the time of the early Renaissance, in the fifteenth century. Mirrors were rare until 
around 1630, and thus highly prized (p. 28). During the Renaissance, the mirror offered an 
unprecedented tool for the elaboration of ideas of self and identity that were beginning to take 
shape. From then on, the mirror “lends itself to self-examination and interior dialogue,” 
offering “a new way of looking at the world” (p. 126). The mirror allows ‘Man’ to become an 
object for his own contemplation, but it also facilitates his sense of dominance over the 
world, because it offers to place him at the centre and origin of meaning and creation. 
According to Melchior-Bonnet: “the specular encounter multiples [Man’s] strength by 
inviting him to both cast himself upon the world and study himself within it” (p. 162). 
The seventeenth century French philosopher, Rene Descartes, did much to formalize 
this way of thinking. Cartesian philosophy is premised on the idea that the mind is like a 
mirror, containing representations of the world that can be made more accurate through 
inspection, repair and polishing (Rorty, 1980, p. 12). Instigating a practice of radical critique, 
Descartes sought the true foundations for knowledge by stripping away all that could be 
doubted, including the material world made available via the senses. Negating the external 
world, and even his own body, Descartes famously arrived at the indubitable: the fact of his 
own thinking, captured in the famous dictum, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist,’ or cogito ergo 
sum (Descartes, 2006, p. 29). The capacity to think here offers certainty, giving birth to a new 
conception of both knowledge and subjectivity. The mind – self-present and transparent, 
rational and certain – comes to be seen as the subject and source of knowledge; and the 
material world becomes an object that the singular, separate mind contemplates and comes to 
know. To put this another way: The idea that the mind is like a mirror assumed a gap between 
‘Man’ and ‘Nature,’ an insurmountable and alienating distance. 
Bernard Murchland (1971) writes that the alienation wrought by modern philosophy 
finds its origins in the work of the early Christian theologian, St. Augustine, who posited a 
dualism between Godly spirit and base matter (pp. 49-53), one that foregrounds the 
supremacy of the non-material in an economy of value. This way of thinking was developed 
by the medieval philosopher, Ockham, who elaborated a theory of nominalism, according to 
which the world is made up of separate and discreet objects (pp. 53-62). These thinkers 
foregrounded the basic idea that the mind is separate from world, and this way of thinking 
was elaborated by Descartes and later in the work of Locke, Rousseau and Hegel, and then on 
into twentieth century Existentialism. In terms that recall Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (2002), first published in 1944, Murchland suggests that “many of our 
present dilemmas originate in the uses to which reason has been put in the course of history” 
(p. ix), and he sets out a narrative of the advancing estrangement of humans from the natural 
world. In short, it is the reification of the world, rooted in Christianity’s attitude to the 
material and to human mortality, which underwrites and perpetuates an alienated existence. 
This discourse of advancing estrangement between Man and Nature is central to the 
sociological conceptions of modernity that arose towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Sociology took shape as a discipline during that tumultuous period in an effort to understand 
the character and structure of ‘modern’ society. Indeed, sociology is an inherently ‘modern’ 
discipline, offering “a reflection on modernity” (Delanty, 2000, p. 21) born out of a strong 
sense of rupture from the past and tradition (p. 29). Informed by a Hegelian philosophy of 
history, the discipline characterized ‘modernization’ as a process of individualization, 
rationalization and the alienation of Man from pre-modern Nature. For Georg Simmel, one of 
the most prolific sociologists of the fin-de-siècle, modernity constituted a process of 
culturalization and alienating de-personalization, as it brought about the separation of modern 
Man from the immediacy, and wholly subjective experience, of the world around him 
(Delanty, 2000, p. 37; Felski, 1995, p. 42). Culture, on Simmel’s analysis, mediates the 
relation between Man and world, bringing about alienation. 
For Simmel, this process was inherently understood in gendered terms. The separation 
of mind from nature represented the triumph of ‘masculine’ idealism and identity thinking 
over femininized nature (Felski, 1995, p. 41). Woman, considered ‘closer to nature’ due to 
her role in reproduction, provided a signifier for the pre-modern, for a lost and irretrievable 
past. Felski (1995) notes that within the sociological tradition, “changing experiences of and 
attitudes towards time resulting from the industrialization of much of nineteenth-century 
Europe engendered a growing nostalgia for a continuity and tradition perceived to be under 
threat by the accelerated nature of social change. Woman [...] came to stand for a more 
natural past and to be identified with the lost cyclical rhythms of a pre-industrial organic 
society” (p. 39). Thus despite his overt resistance to Romanticism, Simmel adopted many of 
its assumptions. As Kenneth Calhoon (1992) and Barbara Schapiro (1983) both demonstrate, 
the mother, symbol of the feminine, is a prominent figure of nostalgia in both German and 
English Romanticism. In the novel fragment by Novalis (2015), Heinrich von Ofterdingen, 
for instance, the figure of the mother signifies a form of merger that stands in contrast to the 
alienation brought about by the discourse of mastery that dominates in the masculine public 
sphere (Calhoon, 1992, p. 13). Alternatively, we might recall Wordsworth’s famous 
rendering of the mother and “infant Babe” in Book Two of The Prelude (1959). 
Wordsworth’s infant “drinks in the feelings of his Mother’s eye,” an image of incorporation 
that foreground the interrelation of subject and object prior to an alienating ascension into 
masculine public space and culture.  
Such ways of thinking have had a profound effect on the discourse of psychoanalysis 
itself. As Freud famously averred, whatever he may have discovered, the poets said it first. 
“In what was at first my utter perplexity,” he writes in Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930), “I took as my starting point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that ‘hunger 
and love are what moves the world’” (p. 117). Freud’s famous ‘oceanic feeling’ refers to a 
putatively primordial experience or merger with the mother, one that must be overcome 
through a paternal identification that brings both individualization and the possibility of 
cultural greatness. This was a way of thinking foregrounded in the work of Johann Jacob 
Bachofen, which influenced Freud (see Sprengnether, 1990). Bachofen suggested – 
somewhat eurocentrically – that the identity thinking characteristic of modernity was 
established by the Greeks, who favoured a patriarchical social organization in opposition to 
the matriarchal culture of the Minoan civilization of Crete. This move from the maternal to 
the paternal signified and enshrined the ascendance of the ‘masculine’ principle of separation 
and autopoesis over material dependence (see Goux, 1993). In his own early work, Lacan 
himself avers that the Oedipus myth so beloved by Freud symbolizes “the emancipation from 
matriarchal tyranny” represented by the Sphinx (‘l'épisode du Sphinx, représentation non 
moins ambiguë de l'émancipation des tyrannies matriarcales’) (2001, p. 58). 
Though dating from Antiquity, the process of ‘modernization,’ understood as separation, 
gained pace from the fifteenth century, as changes in the mode of production brought new 
forms of social organization into being. In his early work, Lacan foregrounds the importance 
of sociological considerations in theorising psychic life. Rather than representing the 
universal structure of mental life, the Oedipus complex is historically specific and contingent. 
Lacan states that “considering both mental structures and social facts will lead to a revision of 
the complex that will allow us to situate the paternalistic family in history and to further 
clarify the neurosis of our time” (‘L'ordre méthodique ici proposé, tant dans la considération 
des structures mentales que des faits sociaux, conduira à une révision du complexe qui 
permettra de situer dans l'histoire la famille paternaliste et d'éclairer plus avant la névrose 
contemporaine’) (Lacan, 2001, pp. 45–46). In this text, Lacan links the ‘family complexes’ to 
the development of the conjugal family in the fifteenth century, a form that combined 
aristocratic norms concerning marriage with the Christian emphasis on individual 
responsibility and choice. This change in the structure of social relations “realized itself in the 
fifteenth century with the economic revolution that produced the bourgeois society and the 
psychology of modern man” (Lacan, 1995, p. 198, 2001, p. 69). The prerequisite for the 
development of modern subjectivity is the family form, which makes possible the modern, 
oedipal struggle against tradition and authority. On this analysis, the idea of a subject separate 
and detached from nature is premised on a specific mode of paternal identification. In 
modernity, symbolic authority shifts from religion and feudal patriarchy to the father, the 
symbol of patriarchy within the home, and the modern Oedipus complex is born. The father 
is required to provide the son with a model for social identification and to enforce sexual 
repression. Yet the father in modernity is always at risk of failing in this function, of failing 
to adequately symbolize the paternal law he is supposed to instil. The father is “always in 
some way deficient – absent, humiliated, divided or false” (Lacan, 1995, p. 200). This 
potential for failure means that the male child does not identify the father as the agent of 
repression, and thus does not develop a strong paternal super-ego. Instead, the male child 
only takes up half of the paternal law, the relation of identification. He comes to identify with 
the father and give up the mother not because the father tells him to, but rather in order to 
gain the social advantage and prestige his father, as a man, represents (Brennan, 1993, p. 58). 
When the paternal imago is weak, as Lacan believes it to be in his own time, the energy of 
sublimation created by the dual paternal function is diverted from creation (Lacan cites the 
Enlightenment as a high point for sublimation) into an “ideal of narcissistic integrity” 
(‘quelque idéal d'intégrité narcissique’) (Lacan, 2001, p. 56). In short, the modern ego fails 
to surmount the Mirror Stage. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, Lacan’s understanding of subjectivity is 
profoundly grounded in the context of modernity (see Brennan, 1993; Campbell, 2004; 
MacCannell, 1991). As Jacques-Alain Miller (2006) affirms, “there is [...] but one ideology 
Lacan theorizes: that of the “modern ego,” that is, the paranoiac subject of scientific 
civilization” (p. 852). In Mladen Dolar’s words (1998) “Lacan largely defined his project 
with the slogan announcing a “return to Freud,” but subsequently it turned out that this slogan 
had to be complemented with a corollary: the return to Freud had to pass by way of a return 
to Descartes” (p. 14). For Lacan, the ego commonly understood to constitute the modern 
philosophical subject, and so beloved of the ego psychologists, requires considerable critique. 
At the beginning of Seminar II (1988), dating from 1953, Lacan asserts that the ego has been 
“acquired over the course of history” (p. 4). It emerges with modernity and is articulated in 
the philosophy of Descartes (p. 6). Lacan sees the ego as the “fundamental illusion of man’s 
experience, or at least of modern man” (p. 4), and his work constitutes a historically grounded 
critique of the modern ego/ cogito, which considers itself to be the centre and ground of 
meaning, creation and knowledge.  
Lacan uses the idea of the mirror to frame his critique of the cogito. In the opening 
paragraph of one of the most famous texts included in his Ecrits, the 1949 paper on ‘The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the ‘I’’ (presented at the16th International 
Congress of Psychoanalysis at Zurich) (2006b) Lacan writes that:  
The conception of the mirror stage I introduced at our last congress thirteen years ago [at 
the 14th International Congress in 1936], having since been more or less adopted by the 
French group, seems worth bringing to your attention once again—especially today, 
given the light it sheds on the function in the experience psychoanalysis provides us of it. 
It should be noted that this experience sets us at odds with any philosophy directly 
stemming from the cogito. (p. 75) 
As Lacan makes clear, psychoanalysis represents a challenge to the cogito, and to the three 
centuries of philosophy that have largely issued from it, even when in a critical mode (Dolar, 
1998, p. 11).  
 In the worlds of Ellie Ragland (2008), the ‘Mirror Stage’ has the effect “of dividing 
the infant away from its mother” (p. 100), a comment that takes on additional significance 
when viewed through the lens of the sociological understanding of modernity previously 
discussed. For Shuli Barzilai (1999), Lacan’s invocation of the Mirror Stage is more 
motivated, as it enables “an exorcism of the powerful maternal presence” (p. 83). Whatever 
interpretative stance one takes on this question, Lacan describes the ‘erection’ of the alienated 
subject of modernity using the metaphor of the mirror. This is a subject that, in line with 
Cartesian philosophy, finds itself through an act of representation, and is reflected 
everywhere it looks (see Borch-Jacobsen, 1991; Brennan, 1993; Whitebook, 1996). There is 
no other in the relation with the mirror – Lacan makes clear that this moment takes place 
“before [the infant] is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other” (2006b, p. 
76). Nor is the mirror the face of the mother or caregiver. Though the child’s carer may be in 
the background, the infant is supported by the prosthesis of the trotte-bebe: a technical means 
of support, thus minimising the presence of others (Barzilai, 1999, p. 85). Lacan is well aware 
of the baby’s interest in the mother’s face: the new-born is “fascinated by the human face,” 
and “in the clearest possible way […] from all the people around him he singles out his 
mother” (Lacan, 1953, p. 15). However, the modern ego is not formed through an exchange 
of looks between two, but rather through an identification with a falsely coherent image of 
self.  
Barzilai (1999) writes that the mirror theory grounds identity in “identification with the 
semblable, or self-same” (p. 88), and Elisabeth Roudinesco (2003) insists that “the specular 
world, in which the primordial identity of the ego is expressed, contains no alterity or 
otherness” (p. 30). The modern ego, the Cartesian cogito, comes into being by erroneously 
assuming that it is the centre and source of itself and the world. The absence of alterity, 
however, does not result in a harmonious relation. Rather the sameness of the other poses a 
threat. The other in the mirror is a rival who threatens to usurp one’s identity, which produces 
anxiety and aggression (Lacan, 2006a, p. 89). The identification with the mirror image is 
“shadowed,” Vicky Lebeau (2001) writes, “by a drive to violate that image” (p. 52). The ego 
is affected by an ambivalent mix of love and hate that will pass over into all secondary 
identifications, and into modern Man’s relationship with the natural world. 
Lacan develops his critique of the narcissistic modern subject in “Aggressiveness in 
Psychoanalysis” (2006a), dating from 1948. Such a being cannot reach or acknowledge the 
other because the way is blocked by their own narcissism. Instead of finding the other in the 
world, the cogito/ ego imposes its own frame of reference on what it encounters – women, 
nature, other cultures and peoples – enacting their blotting out. Lacan writes that “that which 
constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and substantiality, 
in short, with entities or ‘things’ [...] extends indefinitely [man’s] world and his power...by 
giving his objects their instrumental polyvalence” (pp. 90–91). The modern ego constitutes 
the objects it finds in its own image, in line with its modes of understanding, and this is an 
alienating process which “imposes the ego’s rigidity on the object, making it into an object of 
technical control and manipulation” (Whitebook, 1996, p. 126).  
Man comes to control the world by turning it into an object, subjecting it to his categories, 
“stamping his image on reality” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 95), but this leads the ego to become 
paranoid, fearful that its power to control and define may be precarious. Violence offers a 
means to maintain control over objects that threaten to slip out of the ego’s grasp. The 
aggressiveness that has come to define modernity is, Lacan suggests, a result of the cogito’s 
narcissism, a way of relating esteemed in ‘Western civilization’ as the virtue of “strength,” 
which underwrites domination of the natural world and of others, driving capitalization and 
colonialism (Lacan, 2006a, p. 98). The objectivizing knowledge of modern scientific 
civilization, Lacan asserts, both dominates and reifies the world, enacting what Brennan 
(1993) names an “objectifying assault on reason” (p. 32). Lacan’s view here resembles 
Adorno’s understanding of the relationship between subject and object in modernity: “today 
it is the reified consciousness that has been retranslated into reality and there augments 
domination” (2004, p. 310).  
Given that it constitutes the dominant mode of subjectivity in modernity, the 
psychoanalyst encounters this narcissistic subject on the couch, and is tasked with treating it 
as a form of pathology. Describing the social function of the French psychoanalyst in 1948, 
after France’s involvement in Two World Wars, and collaboration with Nazi Germany, Lacan 
writes that “it is this being of nothingness [the cogito/ego] for whom, in our daily task, we 
clear anew the path to his meaning in a discreet fraternity” (2006a, p. 101 emphasis added).i 
Offering ‘Some Reflections on the Ego’ (1953) to the British Psycho-Analytic Society in 
1951, Lacan calls the ego/cogito “the human symptom par excellence” (p. 17), and seeks to 
place “our role as analyst in a definite context in the history of mankind” (p. 12). 
Psychoanalytic dialogue, he claims, aims to dissolve the reification of the ego, bypassing, 
through free association, its rigidity in order to “re-establish a more human relationship” 
(1953, p. 17).  
During this period, immediately after the Second World War, Lacan is most certainly 
“resolutely on the side of the symbolic,” as Jacqueline Rose puts it (1986, p. 46). The solution 
to the rampant narcissism of modernity lies in the “human relationship” made possible by 
“fraternity.” In short, the solution lies in a form of masculine identification that might foster 
creativity and rekindle the conscience of Modern Man.  The alienation wrought by modernity 
made the horrors of colonialism and war possible, but alienation also represents the solution 
to those horrors. “It is the gap separating man from nature that determines his lack of 
relationship to nature, and begets his narcissistic shield, with its nacreous covering on which 
is painted the world from which he is for ever cut off,” Lacan writes, “but the same structure 
is also the sight where his own milieu is grafted on to him, i.e. the society of his fellow men” 
(1953, p. 16). Modern Man is alienated from the natural world, cut off from his own 
materiality and dependence, but alienation from Nature is also a necessary prerequisite for 
modern, masculine ‘Culture.’ For the oedipal social relations, or contract, between men in 
modernity. Here in his early work, as Frederick Dews (1995) describes, Lacan’s position is 
close to that of the Frankfurt School theorists, Adorno and Horkheimer, whose reliance on 
Freudian theory left no alternative but to advocate more castration in response to the ‘culture 
of narcissism.’  
The task of analysis becomes then, according to Lacan, the taming of the cogito through 
its further alienation. In releasing the narcissistic modern individual into a “discreet 
fraternity,” the analyst makes it possible for a third term to intervene in the dyad between the 
ego and the world made over as mirror. The analysand will come to realize, over the course 
of their analysis, that they are spoken by the other; that their desire for coherence and insight 
is part of the narrative of the cogito; that really there is no one who knows or who masters. 
Rather, there is a subject whose centre lies elsewhere, a fact that brings with it a taming of 
narcissism, and a renewed awareness of conscience and responsibility. Describing this 
situation, Norman Bryson (1988) writes that “psychoanalysis is that experience of speaking 
on the field of the other. The analysand does not stand at the center of control over these 
motions of the Signifier; he or she is more like their bewildered observer” (p. 94). 
Undergoing analysis becomes, then, a means of overcoming the grandiose and narcissistic 
idea that we are the unmediated centre of knowledge and the world, a change achieved when 
perspective is reversed and we realize we are subjects, not masters.  
Whilst Lacan is critical of the cogito, erected through a paternal identification made 
possible by the social relations of modernity, the extent to which he offers a satisfactory 
reformulation is a moot point. In her study of Lacanian theory and feminist epistemology, 
Kristen Campbell (2004) reconstructs Lacan’s later social theory in order to demonstrate the 
link between the cogito, the Discourse of the Master, and the paternal family structure (pp. 
65-77). On her analysis, it is the masculine subject’s capacity to identify with the “unary 
trait” (Lacan, 2008, p. 154) of the phallus, symbolized by the father’s penis, which 
underwrites that subject’s sense of its own Oneness, completion and mastery. This 
identification permits the denial of ontological lack, and its projection onto the feminine 
other. However, whilst Campbell finds the interrelation of patriarchy and the discourse of 
mastery in Lacan’s work of critical value, she is less convinced by his approach to its 
solution. As she puts it, “ultimately, Lacan calls for the Father” (p. 165). As indicated in his 
early work on the ‘Family Complexes’ (2001), for Lacan the narcissism of modernity results 
from the failure of the father to adequately perform the function of repression. Whilst the 
male child will, in general, come to identify with the father, he will only take up the ideal 
dimension of this relation, not its prohibition. In his later work (2016), Lacan calls for the 
production of a new, synthetic Name-of-the-Father – a kind of ‘synth-homme’ – capable of 
mitigating the narcissism of modernity. Following the example of James Joyce, 
transformation will come through the production of a new discourse, one that challenges the 
norms of rationality and mastery.  
For Paul Verhaeghe and Frédéric Declercq (2016), however, Lacan’s seminar on The 
Sinthome (2016) locates the cure for the modern cogito “entirely in the line of femininity” (p. 
21). The solution to illusory mastery will come through an appeal to what is excluded from 
masculine modern discourse, what exists beyond or in excess of the phallic law: woman. For 
Ellie Ragland, “this places man within a logic of the finite, the faute, as opposed to women 
who dwell within the logic of the particular and the infinite, not all (pas-toute) under the 
sway of phallic law” (2013). Thus the solution to masculine narcissism lies in the direction of 
femininity and the impossible world of the Real, taken up by the French feminists who 
proceeded Lacan. The extent to which such thinking breaks out of a masculine understanding 
of the feminine – as that which is outside of and opposed to the social and the symbolic – is, 
however, another moot point, and beyond the scope of this article.  
Turning to Lacan’s seminar on the Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
(1977), however, it may be possible to unpack this dichotomy. In this seminar, the situation 
of “spectacular absorption” which forms the ego in the mirror paper takes on another 
resonance, as etymological association slides from speculum (mirror) towards spectaculum 
(view, aspect). As Barzilai (1999) remarks, by invoking the mirror in his early discussion of 
ego formation, “Lacan had the good fortune […] to select an exemplum in 1936 that was 
eminently reusable for his evolving purposes” (p. 188). In the famous seminar of 1964, Lacan 
draws attention to the “signifying dependence” (p. 77) of the ego, which takes itself to be the 
centre of the world. The philosophical tradition has given primacy to the eye and its 
experience, forgetting “the dependence of the visible on that which places us under the eye of 
the seer […] something prior to his eye […] the pre-existence of a gaze – I see only from one 
point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides” (p. 72). The philosophical project of 
phenomenology, cotemporaneous with Lacan’s thinking, is thus undermined for failing to 
account for the gaze, which determines what one sees, and what can be seen. “In our relation 
to things,” Lacan writes, “in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and 
ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to 
stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it – that is what we call the gaze” (p. 73). In 
this way, the gaze challenges that “fundamental mode to which we referred in the Cartesian 
cogito, by which the subject apprehends himself as thought” (p. 80). No matter where I look 
at the world from, I cannot master the gaze, which shapes, at the most basic level, what I can 
see.  
Though Lacan takes the idea of the gaze from Sartre (1992), their understandings are not 
identical. For Sartre, in line with the confrontational character of the Hegelian dialectic, the 
gaze stands for the objectivising look of the other, the unseen look that falls on me, 
challenging my status as centre of meaning and creation. As is well known, Sartre’s 
understanding of the gaze traces the contours of a specific form of intersubjectivity, one 
grounded in a paranoid view of self and other, caught in a fight for dominance. On Bryson’s 
analysis (1988), the gaze is not about the look of a specific other, though Lacan states that 
“the gaze in question is certainly the presence of others as such” (1977, p. 84). Rather the 
gaze speaks of the role of impersonal forces in shaping what can be seen. In this way, 
Lacan’s formulation foregrounds the role of the Other in structuring experience and 
perception. It thus “intentionally unsettle[s] the ontological assumption that anything 
concerned with human subjectivity might be as self-contained and self-enclosed as Descartes’ 
cogito” (Barzilai, 1999, p. 195). “What determines me,” he writes, “at the most profound 
level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside” (Lacan, 1977, p. 106).  
By drawing attention to “the gaze that is outside,” Lacan seeks to reiterate the decentred 
nature of subjectivity, the illusory quality of the modern subject’s sense of detachment from 
the world. The fact of “external focalization,” writes Barzilai, “of being looked at and re-
presented to one’s self is crucial for the skein of reflexive consciousness that delimits 
subjectivity” (1999, p. 190). The ‘I’ is the product of such externalized representation. But 
who is the other that provides this external focalization through which the ‘I’ of the modern 
subject comes into being? Does the concept of the gaze refer to that which the modern subject 
renounces in separating itself from Nature, namely the relation with the Real, and thus the 
mother, or is this a reference to paternal castration? Ultimately, it must be remembered that 
the paternal function of castration is part of a chain of signifiers which originate with the 
mother. 
Lacan claims that the subject is “photo-graphed” (p. 106), made and made over by a look 
from elsewhere, and this look shapes the subject by shaping their desire. Lacan speaks of a 
subject “sustaining himself in a function of desire” (p. 85) that presupposes the gaze of the 
other (Barzilai, 1999, p. 190). That first other whose desire shapes the subject, as Lacan 
repeatedly avers, is the mOther. This desire is linked to the gaze by Lacan: “I would say it is 
question of a sort of desire on the part of the Other, at the end of which is the showing” (p. 
115). As Barzilai puts it, “the signifying functions of the eye and the male organ come into 
conjunction with several coordinated concepts” (p. 190). There is a chain from the child’s 
desire for the mother’s look, to lack, to the objet a, the gaze, and other people. However, 
though the mother and her care give the lie to the idea of an autonomous subject, this care has 
been disavowed in modernity, as the Cartesian subject establishes itself as independent of the 
world around it. If the gaze is “others as such,” i.e. the social world, this moment of 
(masculine) heteronomy masks an early moment of (feminine) heteronomy, the disavowal of 
which is made possible by modern social relations and the gendered assumptions of the 
philosophical and sociological traditions.   
As Herbert Marcuse (1989) notes, the idea of the bourgeois individual – informed by the 
philosophy of the Cartesian subject – necessitates the denial of dependence: “self-sufficiency 
and independence of all that is other and alien is the sole guarantee of the subject’s freedom. 
What is not dependent on any other person or thing, what possesses itself, is free” (p. 60-61). 
Identification with the “unary trait” of the phallus, and with (br)others who have also 
internalized this ideal, creates an illusion of autonomy and mastery, one premised on the 
projection of dependence elsewhere: onto the feminine/private sphere (Benjamin, 1990, p. 
187). As Jessica Benjamin insists, prefiguring Campbell’s reconstruction of Lacan, “the 
structure of gender domination is […] materialized in the rationality that pervades our 
economic and social relations” (p. 187). As Lacan had long argued, the cogito that dominates 
modern understandings of the subject is based on an illusory and singular identification with 
wholeness, with The One. The modern subject repudiates its dependence on a feminine 
(m)Other in order to secure its illusory freedom. Benjamin and Campbell both convincingly 
argue that the modern masculine subject comes into being by repudiating ontological 
dependence, or “lack” (Benjamin, 1990, pp. 133–182; Campbell, 2004, pp. 59–77). 
In light of these perspectives, and Lacan’s appeal to the feminine in his late work, 
Winnicott’s (1991) theory of the ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ takes on considerable 
resonance. Unlike Lacan, Winnicott rarely engaged overtly with philosophical concepts and 
debates. He (1958b) was reluctant even to read Freud, and acknowledged that he may have 
stolen his ideas from others, though he didn’t much care to find out from whom! Yet 
Winnicott’s paper, written in 1967, offers an overt engagement with Lacan, and an 
acknowledgement of his influence. Winnicott notes that he was inspired to write by Lacan’s 
view, prompted by something absent from Lacan’s paper, namely the early relational 
exchange between the child and their caregiver, most often the mother. In fact, he is resolute 
about this: “Lacan does not think of the mirror in terms of the mother’s face in the way that I 
wish to do here,” he writes at the start of the paper (1991, p. 111). Winnicott does not 
mention that elsewhere Lacan had demonstrated an awareness of the importance of the 
other’s face for the infant child (1953). As previously mentioned, when he spoke in London 
in 1951 Lacan remarked on the fascination the face, especially the face of the mother, held 
for the child. That this exchange is not part of the formation of the cogito may reveal a 
considerable amount about the cogito’s presuppositions. 
If Lacan provides a critique of those narcissistic presuppositions, Winnicott offers a 
Romantic response, one that focuses attention on the work of care that is undervalued in 
modernity, and excluded from its philosophy. Winnicott’s Romantic sensibility has been 
widely noted and explored in the literature. Gail Newman (1997) compares him with the 
German Romantic poet, Novalis, because of their shared concern with the important 
relationship between creativity and subjectivity. He emblematizes the ‘Romantic’ tendency in 
psychoanalysis for Carlo Strenger (1989, 1997), who draws out the Rousseauian nature of his 
work, in contrast to the ‘Classical,’ Hobbesian affinities of Freud, Lacan and Klein. John 
Turner (1993) has highlighted Winnicott and Wordsworth’s shared interest in play and 
paradox. He has also foregrounded Winnicott’s importance as a thinker who sees the value of 
illusion, in contrast to the demystifying imperatives of Freud (Turner, 2002). For Emily Sun 
(2007), Winnicott and the poet Keats offer resources for theorising a “therapeutic poetics,” 
capable of facilitating the working through of traumatic experience. However, the most 
important affinity between Winnicott and the Romantics for our present purposes is of course 
their shared interest in, and valorization of, the mother as a figure of critical nostalgia. For the 
Romantic writers of both Germany and Britain, active around the turn of the nineteenth 
century – and thus witnesses to revolutions both political and industrial – the maternal figure 
offered a powerful symbol of Nature, and a means to critique the rationalizing, universalizing 
and alienating discourses generated by the fraternal Enlightenment.  
Winnicott’s attention to, and esteem of, the mother’s role owes an obvious debt to this 
Romantic tradition, which often turned to the exchange of looks between mother and child, 
considering them as a source of connection, love and understanding, “a perfect, and wordless, 
exchange,” in the words of David Wellbery (1996, p. 25). One cannot forget Winnicott’s 
exclamation, “there is no such thing as a baby!” (1958a, p. 99): a powerful statement of the 
importance of care for child development. However, for Winnicott, as Jessica Benjamin 
(1990) has argued, the mother does not represent a lost form of merger and plenitude without 
difference: “the recognition the child seeks is something the mother is able to give only by 
virtue of her independent identity. […] The mother cannot (and should not) be a mirror; she 
must not merely reflect back what the child asserts; she must embody something of the not-
me; she must be an independent other who responds in her different way” (Benjamin, 1990, 
p. 24).  
When the child looks, they do not find their own image in a mirror. Rather, they find 
themselves in the face of an other. “What does the baby see when he or she looks at the 
mother’s face?” Winnicott writes, “I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is 
himself or herself. In other words, the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is 
related to what she sees there. All this is too easily taken for granted” (1991, p. 112). 
Winnicott does not suggest that there is no difference between the look of the child and the 
mother: she is not a surface on which the child finds only sameness. Though the mother’s 
actions are described in terms of reflection, Winnicott’s use of the term “related” insists on 
difference; what returns to the child is not exactly the same as what is offered through their 
expression; what takes place between mother and child is articulated relationally. The 
mother’s face is not, then, a Lacanian mirror that offers an illusion of wholeness and 
perfection, an image of sameness that prompts aggressivity and competition. Nor is it a 
passive source of oneness to be juxtaposed with the alienation of the modern public sphere. 
The exchange of looks between mother and child involves a form of sociality and relation – 
not perfection – that is disavowed by the gendered discourse of modernity, which 
dichotomizes perfect merger and absolute alienation. 
Peter Rudnytsky (1991) notes the clear alternative that both Wordsworth and Winnicott 
offer to a Lacanian understanding of ego development and sociality. Unlike the infant at the 
Mirror Stage, convinced of his own perfection and autopoesis, Wordsworth’s baby (1959) is 
not an “outcast” cut off from the world around him, and he is not “bewildered” or 
“depressed,” adjectives which might be used with reference to the alienated cogito 
Wordsworth and Coleridge riled against. As M. H. Abrams puts it, drawing on Coleridge’s 
own words, “the persistent objective […] was to ‘substitute life and intelligence…for the 
philosophy of mechanism, which, in everything that is most worthy of human intellect, 
strikes Death” (1971, p. 65).  In Wordsworth’s description of the exchange of looks between 
mother and child in The Prelude (1959), the mother offers a “dear presence” in relation to 
whom the child finds themselves. This scene, of course, can be critiqued for offering a 
sentimental and stereotypical view of motherhood and maternal care. However, read in light 
of the foregoing discussion of the sexuated character of modern knowledge and 
subjectivation coming from Benjamin and Campbell, Wordsworth arguably draws attention 
to what must be repudiated for the individualized, masculine subject to appear. In this 
respect, his critical nostalgia finds affinity with Benjamin’s articulation of the active, 
relational role of maternal care, which is retroactively concealed by the gendered demands of 
the modern Oedipus complex (1990, pp. 133–187).  
Wordsworth’s (admittedly masculine) “filial bond” represents a “dear Presence,” offering 
a vision of interrelation very different to what Rudnytsky terms “the currently fashionable 
doctrine that the human condition is a perpetual aporia or Absence” (1991, p. 80). Rudnytsky 
readily avows his affiliation to Winnicott over Lacan. However, to hold that Winnicott might 
add something to the critique of modernity does not necessitate that we forego the insights 
available through Lacan’s articulation. In other words, what Rudnytsky doesn’t discuss in his 
analysis is the historical specificity of both theories. These are not two disinterested visions 
we might choose between. Rather, Lacan is offering a view of the dominant modes of 
subjectivity, knowledge and vision in modernity, namely an objectivising look coupled with a 
narcissistic subject (and his perspective takes shape specifically in the wake of the horrors of 
the First and Second World Wars, and France’s culpability for collaboration). Winnicott is 
offering an alternative premised on the importance of relationality, dependence and infant 
care (a view with its own ties to the war and its effects). Winnicott’s thinking was 
foundational to the welfare state in the UK, which was itself designed to meet the demands 
associated with the feminized private sphere, the demands of social reproduction, on which 
masculine, fraternal modernity depends, yet which it excludes.  
For Winnicott, following the Romantic tradition, alienation is not inherent to the human 
condition, rather it is a sign that something has gone missing or been disavowed, namely a 
dyadic form of exchange, a form of care. A “significant exchange with the world,” he writes, 
depends on an act of creative apperception, “a two-way process in which self-enrichment 
alternates with the discovery of meaning in the world of seen things” (1991, p. 112). The 
child who gets no reflection from the environment will find their “creative capacity begins to 
atrophy” (pp. 112–113).When the mother fails to reflect the child, when she unwittingly 
projects her own mood onto the child instead of reaching out in response to theirs, the child’s 
connection to the world may fail to develop. In its place, the child may well develop a false 
self, an alienated self that responds to the demands of the world, rather than finding itself in 
the world.  
Critics, such as Kenneth Wright and Peter Rudnytsky (Rudnytsky, 1991; Wright, 1991), 
have argued that the Lacanian mirror describes this negative version of Winnicott’s mirroring 
relation, suggesting that Lacan sets out what happens when reflection goes missing: namely 
the development of narcissism and detachment. There are two ways to interpret this, I think. 
Firstly, following Wright, we can liken the Lacanian mirror to an unreflecting mother, who is 
then held culpable for the development of an alienated false self. Rather than seeking to 
demonize the mother, however, we might suggest that detachment and preoccupation might 
be part of the social lot of many mothers, particularly in (late) modernity under the pressures 
of patriarchal capitalism. However, the narcissism and detachment of the false self are not 
necessarily identical to the mastery of the cogito. The cogito is formed in the act of 
repudiating dependence. The false self is a consequence of dependence and absent care, and 
thus foregrounds their centrality. Though alienated in its own way, the false self is not 
necessarily identical to the cogito – the dominant subject of modernity – but rather the subject 
produced through environmental failure. It testifies to the experience of oppression, rather 
than describing the aetiology of domination. 
Alternatively, we might focus on the idea that Lacan describes what happens when 
reflection goes missing, and understand this to mean what happens when the ‘Mirror Role’ of 
mother and family falls out of view. The Cartesian subject Lacan describes and critiques pays 
no attention to the work of care and relation essential for the formation of a non-alienated 
mode of being. For that subject, being is existing, but how do we come to be? What must be 
denied for the subject of mastery to emerge? Lacan never ceases to remind his audience that 
we are subject to the signifier, giving the lie to the myth of the autonomous subject, yet in his 
own thinking, the active maternal role is supplanted by the paternal role, and separation is 
enshrined over relation. Once again, reflection has gone missing.  
In conclusion, this paper has sought to locate both Lacan and Winnicott’s thinking in the 
context of philosophical and sociological debates about subjectivity and alienation, debates 
suffused with what Susannah Radstone (2007) terms “the sexual politics of time.” It has 
argued that Lacan offers a profoundly psychosocial critique of the dominant structure of 
subjectivity in modernity, which esteems detachment, objectivization and a false universalism 
of the perspective of The One. The modern subject is an alienated subject. The paper has also 
sought to raise the question of how this narcissism, a form of profound cultural sickness, 
might be dissipated. In this regard, it has highlighted Lacan’s call for both a new Name of the 
Father, and a focus on the Real, as resources for change. The paper has also raised the 
question of whether an appeal to the Real, as that which is outside of the social, and 
understood to represent its feminine Other, does not reproduce a masculinist dichotomy 
between rational/ irrational, the singular/ plural, the universal/ particular. With this question 
in mind, and drawing on the work of Benjamin, the paper has sought to suggest that 
Winnicott’s attention to the active role of maternal care may go some way to displacing this 
binary. For Winnicott, the maternal relation is not an impossible Real about which we can say 
nothing, but a site of relational exchange which is retroactively repudiated in modernity, as 
the Mirror Stage suggests.  
Perhaps the purchase of such a perspective is strengthened by recalling, finally, a 
favoured anecdote of Lacan’s. Across his career, Lacan returned to a scene from St. 
Augustine’s Confessions, where Augustine recalls the envy of a young child towards his 
infant brother. Lacan describes the scene in his seminar on the gaze: “the little child seeing 
his brother at his mother’s breast, looking at him amare conspectu, with a bitter look, which 
seems to tear him to pieces and has on him the effect of a poison” (1977, p. 116).This is a 
scene Lacan cites many times, from ‘The Family Complexes’ of 1938 (2001), through 
‘Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis’ dating from 1948 (2006a), to the seminar on the gaze in 
1964. For Lacan, the scene speaks of the relationship between the gaze and the objet a. The 
child Augustine, looking on, desires what his brother has, namely the loving look (amare 
conspectu) of the mother. But Augustine, who we recall has played his part in the aetiology 
of the philosophy of alienation, is cut off from this look. A philosophy of separation depends 
on this renunciation, and that may be where the trouble starts.  
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